Emergent Social Ontology Examples from Artificial Societies

Dr. Martin Neumann Department of Social Sciences University of Osnabrueck

Seminarstr. 33

40974 Osnabrueck, Germany + 49 (0) 5406/807844 martneum@Uni-osnabrueck.de

ABSTRACT

The problem of a realist social ontology has a long-lasting tradition. To employ a notion by Durkheim, this is the question regarding whether or not there is something like an emergent social ‘sui generis’.

In this paper a survey of social simulation models will be analysed with regard to the question of how they could contribute to an explanation of a social ‘sui generis’. Since this question is only implicitly addressed in concrete models, they have to be put into a theoretical framework. Two approaches will therefore be distinguished: The processes of production, and the reproduction of a social level of reality. Yet one class of models focuses on the reproduction of social order by the interplay of structure and agency. By conceptualising emergence as a concrete historical process, on the other hand, archaeological models will be utilised to study the very first production of a social ‘sui generis’.

KEYWORDS

Modelling social theory, social ontology, model survey, models of structure and agency, archaeological models

1. Introduction

Since the very beginning of the development of sociological theories, there has been great debate as to what they should be concerned with. The debate can be characterised by two poles: individualism and collectivism. Individualism, on the one hand, claims that the social has no real existence. Instead, every social phenomenon should be explained in terms its of individual actors. Hence, it is a reductive approach to social reality. On the other hand, collectivism, or holism, as it is often called, insists on an autonomous reality of a social sphere. Such a social sphere is not reducible to any other form of reality. This distinction can be found throughout the history of sociology in various forms and notations. It is sometimes called the micro-macro link, sometimes the problem of structure and agency or system versus Lebenswelt. In some discourse it is also denoted as a problem of scope, but these are generally different aspects of the same debate [Knorr-Cetina 1981, Alexander 1987].

This paper will investigate whether Artificial Societies could contribute to the notion of a social ontology, that is, the holistic approach to social theories. Even though it is frequently claimed that simulation technologies provide a tool to overcome the classical micro-macro dichotomy [e.g. Epstein Axtell 1996, Epstein 1999, Sawyer 2003], an explicit reference to the notion of a social ontology is not very common in Artificial Societies. On the contrary, Epstein [1999] argued that Artificial Societies should aim at a microfoundation of social science. Social simulation models, however, are mainly employed in quantitative sociology and have only recently gained attention with regard to questions of sociological theory. Yet theoretical findings are only implicit in contemporary concrete models. Pointing to these theoretical implications of Artificial Societies, this paper shows that we are indeed justified in speaking of a Durkheimean social ‘sui generis’ – without being committed to metaphysics.

In order to show this, the paper proceeds as follows: First, a short outline of the theoretical problem will be given. Second, by the theoretical differentiation of the reproduction and the very first production of a social ‘sui generis’, the models considered will be distinguished into two classes: the class of models of structure and agency, which contribute to the former question, and archaeological models, which will be applied to the latter.

2. The Question of Social Ontology in Sociological Theory

The holistic approach to social reality is as old as sociology itself. Yet August Comte, the early protagonist of the very name of sociology, claimed that Society is no more decomposable into individuals than a geometrical surface is into its lines, or a line into points [Comte 1967 (1851)]. In the history of sociology, Emil Durkheim’s notion to explain social

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facts only by reference to another social fact [Durkheim 1984 (1895)] in particular marked a starting point for controversial debates. According to Durkheim social forces are as real as astronomical ones [Durkheim 1973 (1897)], determining, e.g. suicide rates by the degree of social integration. Society is claimed to be an autonomous entity ‘sui generis’. Here the term ‘sui generis’ denotes his conviction that although society does not exist without individual human beings, social reality is not reducible to individual actors. Yet he holds the position that the composition of individual elements generates an ontologically new level of reality. Society emerges from the individuals. The notion of an emergent social reality is of central importance to the conception of a social ‘sui generis’ in the tradition of Emil Durkheim [Durkheim 1967, (1898), Esser 1993]. The emergent social ontology is a new form of reality driven by a new kind of laws.

A lack of space prevents a comprehensive review of the debate in the theory of social science regarding this fundamental claim. Durkheim’s work, however, can be seen as setting the stage for a long lasting debate on the nature of the social sciences. As already pointed out by Parsons [Parsons 1937], he emphasised the social preconditions of the social contract, an idea that was recently further elaborated by the evolutionary account of Brian Skyrms [Skyrms 1996, Skyrms 2004]. Classical structural functionalist explanations drew attention to the explanatory power of the value system in constraining an individual action. Hence, the notion of a social reality was methodologically applied by the functionalist approach. It was not, however, able to gain ontological justification [Archer 1995]. Adherents of a social ontology therefore adopted a more defensive position [Gellner 1971, Mandelbaum 1973]. The work of Roy Bhaskar [Bhaskar 1975], Margaret Archer [Archer 1995], Geoffrey Hodgson [Hodgson 2002], Keith Sawyer [Sawyer 2002], or the systemic approach of Niklas Luhmann [Luhmann 1984] are just some of the more recent ontological foundations of a realistic approach to the science of society.

Critics of the structural functionalist explanation [Wrong 1961, Homans 1964], however, argued on ontological grounds that ‘in principle’ the foundation of social structure can only be found in man of ‘flesh and blood’. Hence, the notion of a social reality is highly contested by adherents of methodological individualism, such as Watkins [Watkins 1958] or Collins [Collins 1981] and the rational choice theory [Esser 1985, Elster 1986]. Notwithstanding that recent theoretical developments tend towards more mediating positions [Bourdieu 1987, Giddens 1988], for the sake of the argument the theoretical problems ontological positions have to face, will now be considered:

A realist social ontology has to face the problem of how to legitimise the notion of a social reality. In fact, it implies “a complete break with empiricist assumptions, positivistic prescriptions and the underlying Humean notion of causality” [Archer 1995, p. 23]. Even though the reference to social facts is methodologically quite successful insofar as it improves empirical correlation, it is suspected of reification. Since it fails the empiricist existence criterion of being available to sense data, it is argued that a collectivistic terminology would introduce a mysterious social substance. Hence, within an empiricist framework it has to be suspected to be committed to metaphysics. To meet this criticism, a causal criterion of reality is proposed by protagonists of collectivism [Gellner 1971]. It stresses that even though social reality is not an entity located in space and time, social facts are held to be really existent since they prove to be causally efficacious. The positivist notion of causality, however, relies on observed regularities. This is the Humean notion of causality. Since society is an open system, causal explanations have to face the problem, that these regularities are commonly not generated [Archer 1995, p. 54]. Hence, there is a need for a different conception of causality.

3. The Question of Social Ontology in Artificial Societies

The conception and problems of social reality as described above perfectly match the research programme of Artificial Societies: Artificial Societies provide a virtual laboratory to investigate isolated causal structures. As they do not study empirical data they employ a concept of causality based on conditional sentences to investigate the implications of the model assumptions. Investigations of Artificial Societies are viewed as the “work at the discovery of conditional generalisations” [Doran 1997, p. 74] Hence, firstly Artificial Societies study causal structures and secondly they do not provide the Humean concept of causality as observed regularities. On the contrary, they allow the study of the often surprising results of nonlinear connections and complex interactions. Hence, the result of such a causal analysis might not be a regularity but even, for example, a chaotic attractor. By running a simulation, Artificial Societies allow the study of emergent features inherent in the model assumptions. Stemming from Distributed Artificial Intelligence, the notion of emergence is a central task of explanations provided by this research programme [Gilbert 1995, Epstein 1999, Lansing 2002]. For a comprehensive overview of the topic of emergence see, for example, [Stephan 1999]. Roughly speaking, it denotes the fact that simulation techniques allow the study of model behaviour that can not be derived by analytical mathematical solutions [Axtell 2000, Chaitin 2000]. Yet by studying Artificial Societies, a methodological conception of emergence meets the ontological concept of emergence, as employed in the Durkheimean tradition of social sciences. Thus, it should be expected that Artificial Societies enable the investigation of the notion of a social ‘sui generis’ in computational terms.

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The objective of this task is not only to clarify the sociological theory, but also to meet one of the criticisms of Artificial Societies: Since they allow us to overcome the empiricist barrier, they are suspected of practising fact-free science [Smith 1995]. Even though there are models of concrete historical events, many Artificial Societies are theoretical investigations. The sugarscape model [Epstein Axtell 1996] may serve as a prominent example. Hence, it remains to investigate what the targets of the theories are. Critics [Helmreich 1998] argue that they simply reflect the prejudices of the researchers. A close examination of their relation to sociological theories, therefore, will improve their theoretical consistency. This could be denoted as intersubjective validity. Contributions to this research programme have already been provided, e.g. by Andrew Sawyer, investigating the contribution of Artificial Societies to the micro-macro mapping [Sawyer 2003], by Stephen Lansing, who re-examined the Positivismusstreit in German Sociology, [Lansing 2002], by Riccardo Boera [Boera 2004], who provided reasons to strengthen the interrelation between Sociology and the Complexity Theory, and by Thomas Kron [Kron 2002], who evaluated the Theory of Niklas Luhman by means of Artificial Societies.

4. Examples of Models

Since the question of a social ontology is only implicitly addressed in social simulation models they have to be regarded from a more theoretical point of view: Yet this task will be investigated in the following two different conceptualisations of modelling: First, models of structure and agency will be regarded. These employ an idealised interaction structure that can spontaneously generate social order at any space and time, regardless of its history. Second, it will be investigated how archaeological simulation models could contribute to the question of the social ‘sui generis’. It will be argued that they allow the study of the very first emergence of society in early prehistory.

4.1. Emerging Social Order out of Interacting Agents

The problem of the emergence of a social ‘sui generis’ is implicitly addressed by the problem of the generation of social order by individual interactions, hence, by the dichotomy of structure and agency. Regarding this view, social order is an emerging macro feature of interactions on the micro level. If and how social order can be generated was studied by a series of models [Kron Dittrich 2002, Dittrich et al. 2003, Kron Schimank 2003] whereas “in a basic dyadic setting two agents build up expectations during their interaction process” [Dittrich et al. 2003]. The two agents can be interpreted as Ego and Alter, starting with no knowledge of one another. They build up a communication system by sending messages to each other. Ego starts by a random selection of a message, represented by a number. Alter replies to this message by sending another message to Ego. In the course of simulation they seek to maximise their expectation-expectation, that is Ego’s expectation of what Alter expects Ego to do, and their expectation-certainty, that is Ego’s expectation of what Alter might do.

This allows the study of the problem of double contingency [Parsons 1968] as the main problem of producing social order [Luhmann 1984]. As a reference point for analysing interactions, Parsons identified the problems that, firstly, actors both act and are the object of action and that, secondly, an actor is orientated towards himself and others [Parsons 1968]. Yet this problem can be studied by the notions of expectation-expectation and expectation-certainty.

Simulation runs of these models demonstrate that Luhmann’s proposal [Luhmann 1984] that a self-organising process might produce a comparably stable social order does in fact hold. Social order, however, does not necessarily result from this, but is dependent on specific parameter constellations. In particular, the result depends on selection rules, the agents memory and the number of alternatives for action from which they can choose [Kron Dittrich 2002, p. 243]. Further, the basic dyadic setting was expanded to small world networks [Kron Schimank 2003] and a multi-actor world [Dittrich et al. 2003] to allow for “transitions from a more actor-oriented perspective of social interaction to a systems level perspective”[Dittrich et al. 2003]. In particular in the case of randomly chosen acting agents, it can be observed that order usually disappears [Dittrich et al. 2003]. To sum up, it can be said that by simulating the interplay of structure and agency to investigate communication systems, a fundamental problem of social order is identified: the question of scalability of social order [Lorentzen Nickles 2002, Dittrich et al. 2003]. Yet this result goes hand in hand with the above-mentioned problem of scope.

4.2. Historical Emergence

4.2.1 Conceptual Framework

In the following this problem will be investigated from a different angle in order to utilise another class of models. Following Peter Blau [Blau 1977], it will be proposed to conceptualise social structure as the distribution of a population among social positions. This is because social structure “nearly always includes the concepts that there are differences in social positions, and that there are social relations among these positions” [Blau 1977, p. 27]. Undoubtedly, social positions influence people’s social relations, but they have to be distinguished from mere interaction. At different times the same position can be inhabited by different people. Yet positions gain an autonomous

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reality. It shall therefore be proposed to conceptualise the emergence of a social ‘sui generis’ as the emergence of social positions, which have to be a concrete historical process that took place in time.

Archaeological findings indicate that this process might be located at the emergence of a social stratification in the Palaeolithic period [Mellars 1985, Aigner 1989, Kolb 1994, Renfrew 2001, Earle 2004]. No archaeological indicators for a social stratification can be found in earlier societies. In the course of cultural evolution, however, “egalitarian principles of burials were violated when extraordinary items of gold started to be placed with certain individuals, presumably to mark their social difference.” [Earle 2004, p. 112]. It seems to be highly plausible that the process of social stratification goes hand in hand with the emergence of social positions. Thus, here we have an autonomous element of social reality, which evolved in the course of time.

4.2.2. Archaeological Modelling

Yet in the following archaeological models shall be analysed inasmuch they contribute to the modelling of the emergence of a social ‘sui generis’.

Archaeological modelling is a growing discipline. The investigation, however, will concentrate on two models: The EOS model [Doran 1994] of the emergence of social complexity in the Upper Palaeolithic period of south–west Europe and the MÜE & ERB model [Müller 1991] of the emergence of the state. The EOS model deals with a very early time period of the evolution of social complexity. Its target system is the time period of 15 00 to 30 000 BC. MÜE & ERB covers the time period of 6000 – 1500 BC. While the EOS model is concerned with the beginning of the emergence of a social ontology, the emergence of the state might be seen as bringing this process to a close. Thus, the objective for this choice is to cover a considerable amount of the whole process.

4.2.2.1. The EOS Model

The target of the EOS model is to develop an agent-based model of a theory [Mellars 1985] of the growth of social complexity in the Upper Palaeolithic period of south–west Europe [Doran 1994], that is 15 000 to 30 000 years ago. In contrast to egalitarian societies, complexity is defined as containing centralised decision-making, ranking, role differentiation, and territoriality [Cohen 1985]. Hence, among other features, the evolution of social stratification is denoted by the notion of social complexity. Mellars stresses that a particular combination of ecological conditions led to a population concentration and comparably stable and long-lasting social groups. This was a crucial step towards the emergence of social complexity, i.e. the formation of hierarchies.

The model is an agent based model written in Prolog. Its main features are [Doran 1994]:

a) a two-dimensional simulated environment providing clusters of resources that can be gathered by the agents. When an agent acquires an instance of the resource their number at that locality is reduced by 1. Furthermore, the resources have a specific regeneration cycle and complexity, which is defined as the number of agents necessary to acquire them. The resource complexity ranges from 1 to 48.

b) a population of 32 to 50 agents. The agents are able to collect sensory data, move around in the environment, form plans for resource acquisition and communicate with each other about these plans. If the agent is not able to consume resources, its energy level falls below a certain threshold. Then it needs to gain resources. If the level reaches zero, the agent disappears from the simulation; i.e. he ‘dies’.

The working memory of the agents contains a resource model, where the agents keep their beliefs about the location and type of resources and a social model, where an agent stores its beliefs about itself and other agents.

The agents’ social model also contains the notion of a territory. Territories are not properties of the environment but exist as beliefs in the agents’ social model: if one agent observes another agent collecting resources, then it will believe that the location where this occurs is the territory of this agent.

4.2.2.1.1. Simulation Results

In the course of the simulation, the agents act in the following manner: They start without any knowledge of groups or other agents. They collect information about their environment and, if they are able to collect resources individually, they do so. If there are resources that need co-ordinated activity, then they develop plans for collective resource gathering and will attempt to recruit others for the execution of the plan.

A lot of the agents’ behaviour is dealing with the recruitment of a group. One agent sends out information about the resource and the others evaluate this information to decide whether or not to follow. Agents that are able to recruit others become group leaders. The agents whose plans are selected gain ‘prestige’. This leads to a “semi-permanent leader-follower relationship” [Doran 1995, p. 106]. This group structure becomes part of the social model of the agents

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involved. The agents may also leave a group or change from one to another. This process may be iterated, thus leading to a situation where a group leader becomes a participant of another group together with his group members. Yet by iterations of this process a social hierarchy is formed.

These hierarchies have the ability to persist from one time circle to another but they may also break down after a while. This is affected by how easily agents decide to operate independently of their leader and how long they believe to be part of a group when they are not in contact with it and how they operate in such a case [Doran 1994, p. 214].

Since the resources need the co-ordination of collective actions, the model performs three core processes. It is claimed [Doran 1994, p. 206] that this is due to population concentration. The processes are:

• Temporary planned co-operation between the agents,

• conversion of temporary into semi-permanent groups and, finally, • the development of hierarchy structures.

Hence, the EOS model allows the study of mechanisms of the emergence of social stratification out of egalitarian groups of agents.

4.2.2.2. MUE & ERB

The target of MUE & ERB is the emergence of the state. This took place at circumscripted territories along river valleys. It went hand in hand with a new type of agricultural production, alluvial agrarian production, generating a remarkable surplus, unknown in former organisations of securing the subsistence of the society [Carneiro 1970]. As a result, it is highly probable that social differentiation took place, releasing a social class from direct agricultural production [Lenski 1973]. This process is under investigation in the model MUE & ERB.

MUE & ERB is an equation-based model written in DYNAMO. To calculate the number of persons that can be released from direct agricultural production, production is expressed in terms of subsistence minima, called C. Yet a production volume of C = 1 means that the production of one member of the society is sufficient to feed one member of the society. Let the production of one member of the social unit be denoted with Pi. It follows that, given a social unit of N members, the necessary minimal production volume has to be:

Σ Pi ≥ X = NC.

This terminology leads straightforwardly to a calculation of the number of people who can be released from direct agricultural production. Given the number N of members of the social unit and their production volume Pi this number can be derived as:

Σ Pi – N = V (virtual heads)

A fundamental assumption of the theory is that the redistribution of the surplus is performed by specialised institutions, which have to be supported from the surplus. These institutions are denoted by the term ‘power territory’ (PT), governed by a so-called ‘power territory ruler’ (PTR). PTs squat into the surplus [Müller 1989, p. 27] that is derived above. Hence, the maximum size of the social élite is V. However, since in this case no surplus could be redistributed, this is an extreme case of total exploitation. Typically, the PT system is legitimised by a specific competence from which they gain the privilege to distribute the produced surplus. By this operation they are qualified as the main social decision centre [Dye 1976, Müller 1979]. Social operations are performed by persons holding positions in the decision centre [Müller 1985]. This is identified with the PT system. The organisational structure of the PTs is modelled as a strict hierarchy with a PTR at the top, a number of suboligarchs and an even greater number of subordinates. Hence, it is an ideal type of hierarchy.

MUE & ERB is solely a redistribution model, regardless of how the surplus is utilised. Thus, first the generated production volume is calculated. This is done by multiplying the workforce by the labour productivity. Then access priorities to the produced values are formulated for three classes of the social unit: the working class, landlords, and the PT system. After this process, the remaining surplus is open for redistribution. Redistribution is governed by two variables reflecting two strategies of securing power: Both variables react to a comparison of the actual with the desired budget. One strategy is to enhance the revenues by expanding the territory of the PT under consideration. The other strategy is to save expenditures in the case of budget shortening. Yet they are dialectically opposed leading to a nonlinear dynamic.

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4.2.2.2.1. Simulation Results

The simulation run starts roughly at the time when archaeological artefacts indicate first settlements. This is calibrated at 6000 BC. At this time the number of PTR positions remain a sleeping variable. At 1500 BC, however, the model shows a rapid growth of the number of PTR positions. Because of the nonlinear dynamics, this result cannot be calculated by means of analytical mathematics, but emerges as the variable changes its attractor. Sociologically, this is interpreted as the emergence of the state, containing centralised institutions with a bureaucratic structure.

Hence, with regard to the question of modelling social ontology, a fundamental feature of a social reality is created in the model: The emergence of social positions.

4.2.3. Discussion

The EOS model is concerned with the very beginning of the process of the emergence of a ‘social sui generis’, whereas the MUE & ERB model covers a very late period in this respect. It is the beginning of a process of social stratification that can be observed by the EOS model. The MUE & ERB model, on the other hand, enfolds the capacity of a position-generating process. “Now the growth motor is established which, presumably, will be active until nowadays” [Müller 1991, p. 89]. The fact that different periods are under consideration in the two models lead to different but complementary explanatory gaps regarding the question of how social positions could emerge in the early prehistory of human societies. Implications of modelling technologies, however, also have to be taken into consideration:

Within the EOS model the emerging hierarchies are not stable and depend on the individual agents that form the group. Yet it is criticised that the hierarchy remains an “implicit property of the agents’ social model” [Gilbert 1995, p. 154]. Thus, the EOS model takes on a microsociological perspective on the emergence of social stratification. This leads to the result that the model is incapable of generating a social sphere of its own that is not reducible to properties of the agents. This is due primarily to the agent-based modelling technology. It remains an open question, however, as to whether this is a deficit of the model or a correct representation of social reality at around 20 000 BC.

Within MUE & ERB however no individual actors can be represented since the model is an equation-based model. In particular, social institutions are assumed as given and the emergence of the state is resulting out of their internal development. Thus, with regard to the question of the emergence of a social ontology, there is an explanatory gap in some respect complementary to that of the EOS model. While the EOS model remains on the level of agents, this model remains on the level of institutions. Thus, it adopts a macrosociological point of view. Since it is plausible, however, that institutions already existed at the time of the emergence of the state, in this case it might also be a correct representation of the respective social reality.

Hence, both models might be a more or less correct representation of their respective target system. With respect to the process of an emerging of social ontology, however, there remains an explanatory gap.

5. Conclusion and Perspectives

Since there is more need to argue why archaeological models could contribute to the question of a social ‘sui generis’ than is the case in models of structure and agency, the main focus of this survey was on the impacts of archaeological modelling to social theory. It has to be emphasised, however, that both accounts are by no means opposing. They can be regarded as complementary: While the focus of accounts on structure and agency is a timeless situation that could generate social order regardless of its history, the focus of archaeological models is a more concrete social innovation, namely the emergence of social stratification that took place in time. But once this took place, social orders have to be reproduced over time. Yet the accounts can be seen as models of the process of production of a social ‘sui generis’ on the one hand and its reproduction on the other.

The models demonstrate that no metaphysics is necessary to introduce the notion of a social ‘sui generis’. However further research is needed in both accounts: At the moment, therefore, conclusions can only be provisional. In the case of the archaeological models the question is twofold: First, it can be questioned to what extent the explanatory gap is due to modelling techniques, namely to agent-based models on the one hand and equation-based models on the other. The impact of the methodology on social theory should be regarded. Hence, further research is needed to investigate the interrelation between the level of social structure that might be correctly represented by differential equations and an agent-based actor level. This research could investigate how social structure is shaped by person-position relations. In particular, the fact that actors can hold multiple positions has to be regarded.

It might also be the case, however, that the explanatory gap between the models is due to social change between the first emergence of social hierarchies in societies of hunters and gatherers and the establishment of a state in agricultural societies. In particular, there might be an impact of growing complexity simply by a growing number of actors. Research in this direction is currently undertaken by the NewTies project [http//www.new-ties.org].

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Interestingly, exactly the complexity problem also arises in the case of the more abstract models of structure and agency. Social order emerges only in the dyadic setting but vanishes at least sometimes in the case of a multi-actor situation. Hence, in both accounts the problem of scale is of crucial importance. This is a fundamental finding that can be identified by the modelling approach to social theory.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Justus Lentsch and two anonymous referees for their fruitful comments and discussions. Moreover, this project is founded by the Fritz-Thyssen Stiftung. Their contribution is gratefully acknowledged.

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